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Afterword
HOW CAN WE SAVE THE SAFETY NET?'
Frank Munger'
I. INTRODUCTION
In today's affluent society, Americans are being
encouraged to be still more skeptical of claims of poverty, even
while many experience firsthand the inability of the labor
market to provide economic security or stability. Tragically,
welfare programs that should protect citizens from the ravages
of the market increasingly link economic security and relief
from poverty exclusively to successful employment. Aggressive,
pro-market reforms mean that the new safety net protecting
the vast majority of economically insecure and poor Americans
from the ravages of the labor market will be the labor market
itself. But the adequacy of such a market-friendly safety net
depends on universal access to employment that provides a
living wage, economic security, and benefits, including security
from unemployment. For an increasing number of citizens, the
labor market fails to do this.
Welfare recipients are the poorest of the working poor.
Contrary to triumphant interpretations of the sharp decline in
the number of welfare recipients since federal welfare reform in
1996, forcing welfare recipients into the labor market has failed
to result in sustained employment, let alone reduced poverty.'
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Prescribing employment as the solution to poverty has failed.
Even conservatives are concerned about the dismal failure of
reform to address the needs of those who have become destitute
after being denied welfare and forced into the labor market,
namely the significant number of women whose poverty
deepens when they leave welfare.' The fate of other "leavers" is
not well documented - really we have just guesses about their
long-term well-being.' Even the best case scenario, even with
all the Earned Income Tax Credit and other benefits we have to
offer (when the barriers to getting them have been overcome),
new welfare-to-workers have only increased the vast numbers
of working poor who subsist on incomes at about the poverty
line.' These new workfare poor, who are, as one scholar has
said, "working without a job," are like the many millions of
Americans who have always earned less than fifty percent of
the median income and who are economically insecure without
an adequate safety net.'
Moreover, the rollback of the affirmative welfare state
in America has also jeopardized many middle-class Americans.
The least secure of these workers - middle class according to
their income when they are employed - lack access to secure
jobs with benefits. Women in particular bear the burdens of
IN THE NEW AMERICAN LABOR MARKET 150 (2001). See also text accompanying infra
note 46.
2 See Ron Haskins, Effects of Welfare Reform on Family Income and Poverty,
in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 103, 128 (Rebecca M. Blank & Ron Haskins eds.,
2001).
3 See, e.g., Haskins, supra note 2, at 109-12; SANFORD F. SCHRAM, PRAXIS
FOR THE POOR: PIVEN AND CLOWARD AND THE FUTURE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE IN SOCIAL
WELFARE 194-99 (2002).
4 In 2000, 6.4 million full-time workers (those working 27 weeks or more)
earned incomes below the poverty level. See U.S Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor
Statistics, A Profile of the Working Poor, available at
http//www.bls.gov/cps/cpswp2000.htm (last modified Aug. 14, 2002). For welfare
leavers, the most optimistic estimate of the average income of those who are employed
- and many are not - is $17,000, just above the poverty line for a family of three, and
they are still likely to experience substantial spells of poverty without employment.
Pamela J. Loprest, Making the Transition from Welfare to Work: Successes but
Continuing Concerns, in WELFARE REFORM: THE NEXT ACT 17, 20 (Alan Weil &
Kenneth Finegold eds., 2002). Other estimates of their income have been far lower. See
SCHRAM, supra note 3, at 198-99.
5 For a description of trends in low-wage work, see LAWRENCE MISHEL ET
AL., ECONOMIC POLICY INSTITUTE, THE STATE OF WORKING AMERICA, 2000-2001, at 322-
27. See also Gary Burtless & Timothy M. Smeeding, The Level, Trend and Composition
of Poverty, in UNDERSTANDING POVERTY 27 (Sheldon H. Danzinger & Robert H.
Haveman eds., 2001).
(Vol. 69:2
HOW CAN WE SAVE THE SAFETY NET?
economic insecurity, especially women who are single parents,'
but there are many other vulnerable groups. Put simply, the
circumstances of the poorest unemployed and welfare
dependent are not so different from those of the working poor
and vulnerable segments of the working- and middle-classes
who are already working in poverty or who may be a paycheck
away from poverty.7
In response, some recent prescriptions for strengthening
the safety net call for massive restoration of more generous
federal programs, such as welfare and unemployment benefits,
or the creation of new universal benefits guaranteeing a child
allowance or a minimum income Unfortunately, the call to
turn back the clock to the New Deal or to create a more
egalitarian welfare state appears to many to be unrealistic in
an era politically dominated by an ideology of deregulation,
devolution, privatization of government, and individual
responsibility for economic risk.' This is especially true now
that the federal government faces the prospect of massive
deficits for the foreseeable future.1'
What can be done? Some progressive scholars have
turned from advocating revitalization of New Deal programs to
a different approach: creating an enhanced welfare state at the
local level by using the present ideological climate to the
advantage of grassroots organizing." Privatization,
decentralized regulation, and devolution of governance now
guides much progressive thinking, and many scholars of
poverty programs have accepted these premises of
6 See HARRELL R. RODGERS, JR., AMERICAN POVERTY IN A NEW ERA OF
REFORM 29-31 (2000).
7 See Sam Dillon, Report Finds Deep Poverty Is on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 2003, at A18; Monica Davey & David Leonhardt, Jobless and Hopeless: Many Quit
the Labor Force, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2003, at § 1, at 1.
' See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER
CITY, THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987); WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN
WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR (1996) [hereinafter WILSON,
WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS].
9 This is the premise, sometimes unspoken, of the turn to the market,
privatization, and local politics among scholars and activists that I describe in Part IV.
For an explicit acknowledgement of the impossibility of redistribution, and the
importance of placing welfare reform within the context of a dominant ideology
emphasizing work, see JOEL HANDLER & YEHEZKEL HASENFELD, WE THE POOR PEOPLE;
WORK, POVERTY, & WELFARE 215-18 (1997).
10 Mark Gongloff, CNN, The $44 Trillion Dollar Hole?, May 29, 2003, at
http://money.cnn.conV2003/05/29/news/economy/social-security-painl (last visited Feb.
3, 2004).
, See infra Part IV.
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contemporary welfare state changes. But what do advocates
seek at the local level? What qualities do they believe a local
welfare state might possess that would contribute to an
adequate safety net? One answer is that economically insecure
citizens have overlooked opportunities for collective self-help in
today's deregulated, low-wage labor market. A second answer
is that the present ideological climate will support expanding
the safety net through community-based private groups using
public resources to help the insecure worker, the poor mother,
and other economically vulnerable citizens. A third possibility
is building an enhanced welfare state through deeper
democracy at the local level.
Whatever the ultimate design of these models,
increasingly we hear of using the capacity of the local state to
address the economic needs of the poor and economically
insecure. To a degree, this rhetoric has replaced the emphasis
of a previous generation of advocates on affording the poor
more rights.2 We have learned hard lessons about rights.
Rights, and rights in conjunction with the proper kind of social
capital, may be critical to forming a more egalitarian society.
But rights are ambiguous resources, often failing as a means of
social transformation; rights may isolate individuals, polarize
communities, or foreclose discussion of issues that should be
contested in the political arena and considered in view of a
broader vision of democratic change.'3 If our goal is to enhance
the provision of welfare, it may make sense to build better
programs from the bottom where participants themselves can
offer guidance about the benefits and costs. But how can such
"bottom up" solutions be built and what is the role of "top
down" governance and rights?
In this brief Afterword I join a growing number of
scholars and advocates who argue that we must be concerned
about governance itself.14 As advocates for more sustainable,
egalitarian, and culturally diverse social policies, we must
understand the limits of devolution in its present forms and
12 See MARTHA F. DAVIS, BRUTAL NEED: LAWYERS AND THE WELFARE RIGHTS
MOVEMENT, 1960-1973 (1993).
13 The classic statement of the critique of rights is contained in STUART A.
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL
CHANGE (1974). A contemporary, nuanced, and highly relevant discussion of the
critique of rights appears in Jennifer Gordon, New Governance Models, New Roles of
Rights: Lessons from the Underground Economy, N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE
(forthcoming 2004).
'4 See infra notes 85-124 and accompanying text.
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develop new forms that better address the priorities we seek.
We must find ways to re-socialize governance to make it
responsive to broader and more diverse interests. To sustain
such a change, the local welfare state must generate more than
traditional rights or market-friendly social capital. Rather,
governance itself must become interdependent with sustaining
egalitarian and culturally diverse social relations. This is an
immense political task, but a few scholars, among them some
who spoke at this symposium, are already considering what
such a society might look like and how it might be achieved.
Part II of the Afterword describes the moral politics of
security in the modern American welfare state and the
language in which security is debated. I draw attention to the
way political choices behind the contemporary assault on safety
net programs are disguised by the technical language of
marketplace economics. Part III examines some of the changes
in the safety net wrought by such politics and in particular the
unraveling of programs intended to provide security for two
vulnerable groups - low-wage workers and poor, mother-only
families. Part IV considers some of the newest strategies for
reversing safety net erosion. In contrast to "third way"
programs advocated by mainstream liberals, the creation of
new legal entitlements, or proposals to build the social capital
of the poor, the three approaches I discuss all emphasize local
politics and local markets: collective self-help in the private
labor market, extending the state through privatization, and
creating a local, more egalitarian welfare state. All three have
been applied successfully to achieve practical benefits for
economically insecure citizens, but they do not work equally
well to enhance the safety net under all conditions. In a brief
conclusion, I review the main lessons to be learned from these
experiments by summarizing their most promising and
problematic features as solutions for the vanishing safety net.
II. THE OLD POLITICS OF SECURITY IN THE NEW WELFARE
STATE
As America enters the twenty-first century, there is
continuing pressure to adapt the welfare state to the "new
realities" of a competitive global economy. But elements of this
new reality have been shaped by the struggles over values and
ideologies that influence expectations. The challenge of
globalization includes increasing pressure by investors to
deliver higher returns, spawning a dominant pro-market
20041
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ideology that links economic growth and stability to
deregulation and "flexible" labor, and a conservative fiscal
policy that favors downsizing federal government through
devolution to the states and privatizing many services."'
The labor market has indeed changed. Employers have
responded to the pressures of the new economy by shifting
more risks of employment to employees themselves." Shifting
more risk to employees, consumers, or those who can least
afford economic insecurity is a particularly ironic adaptation of
the welfare state - an institution that evolved in all developed
western societies to secure citizens from the ravages of the
unregulated market. 7 T.H. Marshall describes this evolution in
terms of the emergent rights associated with "social
citizenship," including a right to a minimum level of economic
well-being and stability that enables one to effectively
participate as a worker and citizen. 8 Nonetheless, America's
safety net is being rapidly altered to shift more responsibility
for coping with economic insecurity and poverty to the least
secure and poorest members of society. Although proponents
claim that downsizing the safety net is needed to make
markets more efficient and to stimulate growth, available
research suggests otherwise: Low-wage and flexible labor
policies seem to bear little relationship to unemployment levels
or growth.1 If so, what explains the unique response in
America to the increasing economic insecurity?
Welfare policies that support the needs of the labor
market are rooted deeply in Anglo-American history. As early
as the Elizabethan Statute of Laborers, English welfare law
distinguished between the deserving poor who were incapable
of work or excused from work and the "sturdy beggar," the
16 MICHAEL B. KATZ, THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN
WELFARE STATE 26-32 (2001).
' See supra note 1 and accompanying text..
" T.H. Marshall, Citizenship and Social Class, in T.H. MARSHALL & TOM
BOrrOMORE, CITIZENSHIP AND SOCIAL CLASS (1992). See also GOSTA ESPING-
ANDERSEN, THE THREE WORLDS OF WELFARE CAPITALISM (1990).
18 Marshall, supra note 16.
'9 The "low-road" strategy, which emphasizes low-wages and flexibility, has
not been validated by research. Unemployment rates are not strongly associated with
welfare state support for wages. See Joel F. Handler, The "Third Way" or the Old Way,
48 U. KAN. L. REV. 765, 799 (2000). Nor are flexible labor policies uniformly associated
with economic growth. See Rebecca Blank, Does a Larger Social Safety Net Mean Less
Economic Flexibility? in WORKING UNDER DIFFERENT RULES 157-58 (Richard B.
Freeman ed., 1994). For the best and most complex analysis, see David R. Howell,
Increasing Earnings Inequality and Unemployment in Developed Countries: Markets,
Institutions, and the 'Unified Theory,' 30 POL. & SOC'Y 193 (2002).
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needy but able-bodied person who was condemned for not
working. Professor Joel Handler quotes the famous English
Royal Poor Law Commission Report of 1834: "While relief
should not be denied the poor, life should be made so miserable
for them that they would rather work than accept public aid."0
The principle of "less eligibility" - that the poor should receive
no more than the lowest paid laborer in the labor market -
remains the foundation of relief for the "undeserving" poor.
Embodied in the workhouses and poor law of the nineteenth
century, the principle of less eligibility also underlies much of
the American New Deal's construction of a national welfare
state. For example, even as widespread failure of the labor
market established a new theme in American politics - the
politics of security - work programs for relief of widespread
unemployment rejected support for a living wage (e.g., the
short-lived Civilian Conservation Corps) in favor of a program,
the Works Progress Administration, that deliberately paid less
than the labor market.2
The centerpiece of the New Deal's welfare, the Social
Security Act, also embodied the principle of less eligibility by
creating separate programs for meeting the needs of elderly,
but previously fully employed, wage workers, who received
guaranteed old age "insurance,"22 and unemployed women with
dependent children and other unemployed persons, who were
provided short-term, means-tested benefits that were
contingent on appropriate behavior.2 Thus, the two-track
structure of the Social Security Act fully incorporated the
distinction between the needs of those who were deemed
morally "deserving" and those who were deemed morally
"undeserving." Among the latter were three important groups.
First, unemployed, able-bodied workers could receive
unemployment insurance, but the program was administered
at the state level where employers had an opportunity to make
20 Handler, supra note 19, at 779.
21 MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL HISTORY
OF WELFARE IN AMERICA (10th anniversary ed. 1996). See also JOEL F. HANDLER &
YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF POVERTY: WELFARE REFORM IN
AMERICA (1991).
22 Although described as "insurance," the benefits of social security are not
funded by the earnings of the beneficiary but rather through assessments on the wages
of those currently working. Neither funding nor benefits depend upon payments made
by beneficiaries in the ma:-ner of true insurance. See Katherine A. Kost & Frank W.
Munger, Fooling All of th People Some of the Time: 1990's Welfare Reform and the
Exploitation of American Values, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 3, 19 & n.54 (1996).
23 See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 21, at 103-05.
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sure that the terms on which compensation was received did
not interfere with work discipline.2 Second, southern senators
made sure that black agricultural workers were excluded from
old age insurance so that tenant farmers would remain bound
to land owners.25 Third, Aid to Dependent Children (ADC)
provided support for "suitable" parents and their children."
Like unemployment compensation insurance,
administration of the ADC program was decentralized."
Parochial judgments about "suitability" meant in practice that
a few white widows were granted benefits while the majority of
unmarried, divorced, or immigrant women with children were
denied benefits and forced into the labor market.' Thus, the
Social Security Act created a two-track public welfare state: a
federally administered, relatively generous and no-hassle track
for successful workers (and their spouses), and a second, state
or locally administered track with means-tested benefits that
reflected moral judgments about men who were unemployed,
women who worked, and the exclusion of African-Americans
and immigrants from the mainstream. Since the New Deal, the
boundaries of "deserving" and "undeserving" have been
contested, but the moral politics of the welfare state have
continued to reflect conflict over the role of women, racial
stereotypes, and the dominant ideology of the wage labor
market.29
The New Deal left a further legacy by creating a
"politics of security."3" The public welfare state created by the
Social Security Act and related statutes was complimented by
the expansion of private welfare based on a welfare capitalism
model. 1 While proclaiming a "second New Deal" to free citizens
from want, President Franklin Roosevelt refused to support
universal health care or similar benefits for workers. In turn,
newly enfranchised unions, discouraged from pursuing wage
24 Id. at 91-97.
25 JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED THE
WAR ON POVERTY 20 (1994).
26 LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE
HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935, at 45-46 (1994).
27 HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 21, at 103.
GORDON, supra note 26.
HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 9, at 3-11.
30 JENNIFER KLEIN, FOR ALL THESE RIGHTS: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND THE
SHAPING OF AMERICA'S PUBLIC-PRIVATE WELFARE STATE 3 (2003).
3, Id. at 78-116. See also STUART D. BRANDES, AMERICAN WELFARE
CAPITALISM, 1880-1940 (1976).
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demands during World War II, made expansion of fringe
benefits a major goal. The growth of employment-related
health insurance and pension plans was soon supported by a
federal regulatory structure and became the most important
source of welfare for most workers. The enormous investment
by the working class in employment-related benefits altered
the politics of security by dividing the interests of the regularly
employed working class from those of the working class who
were forced to take low-wage, unstable, or part-time jobs.
Those who were privately "taxed" for their employment-related
benefits resisted expanding public welfare programs as double
taxation for welfare. White males dominated the primary labor
market while most women and minorities were excluded from
this market and did not receive private welfare, so the division
between the private and public welfare systems was ripe for a
symbolic politics of security that reinforced gender and racial
stereotypes.
Today, struggles over welfare state programs still
deploy the discourse of the market by focusing on economic
efficiency, devolution, and privatization. While the rhetoric is
new, there is a striking continuity with the past. Denying
welfare - whether poverty relief, workers' compensation,
unemployment compensation, or bankruptcy relief - on the
theory that to grant benefits would unjustly reward idleness is
an old strategy. There is nothing new about arguments that
current beneficiaries receive undeserved benefits or lack moral
character. What is new is that benefits for working and middle
class citizens have been targeted as well as those for the poor
or unemployed. Although the language of market efficiency
suggests that decisions to cut back the welfare state have been
grounded in value-neutral science, in fact such decisions
typically reflect symbolic politics as usual about matters such
as whether regulated behavior constitutes a "moral hazard" or
a wasteful "transaction cost," rather than morally appropriate
reliance on a benefit.32
32 The current Darwinist approach towards welfare, which is clothed in
market terminology, creates a hostile and brutal environment for the poor. The idea of
earning one's citizenship by being a productive member and not being a "transaction
cost" reinforces the notion that the poor have failed themselves and society, thus
deserving the minimal amount of aid. Combined with the pop-psychology idea of
"enabling" creeping into the rhetoric of judging the poor, an unforgiving attitude
towards the poor arises. This attitude is evident in recent court cases as well as
legislative acts. See Brukhman v. Guiliani, 94 N.Y.2d 387, 727 N.E.2d 116 (2000); Jobs
and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-27, 117 Stat. 752
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Moral claims are by no means limited to stigmatizing
the dependent poor, but also characterize the rollback of
welfare state programs that affect a much larger segment of
the working and middle classes. The assault on programs for
the poor employs the most exposed and unselfconscious
rhetoric of moral citizenship. However, the same moral
arguments are being made to justify the rollback of both the
private and the public welfare state.'
For example, pending proposals for bankruptcy reform
are predicated on the assumption that members of the middle
class have regularly abused the bankruptcy laws to relieve
themselves of avoidable debt incurred through decisions to live
beyond their means.' With this assumption in mind, reformers
propose to limit access to discharge of debt through bankruptcy
by adopting a means test that would force bankruptcy
petitioners whose incomes exceed a statutory threshold to
accept discharge conditioned on devoting a large proportion of
their future income to paying off debt. 5 As discussed below,
studies conducted by Professor Elizabeth Warren and her
colleagues have cast considerable doubt on the assumptions
about the moral hazard created by the existing bankruptcy
law,36 conclusions that strongly suggest that moral stereotyping
has influenced the proposal to roll back protections for debtors.
Workers compensation has been similarly targeted. In
response to sharply rising medical costs, employers have
pressured state legislatures for several decades to limit their
liability, seeking to shift more risk and financial responsibility
for injury to their employees. While soaring medical costs are
problematic, the reforms sought have threatened drastic
reductions in benefits to achieve modest savings in employers'
premiums, transferring the resulting uninsured medical costs
to workers and to the public. As Professor Martha McCluskey
(refusing to extend child tax credit to the poor because they do not earn enough to
qualify); Robert Pear, Subsidies to Poor Pose a Hurdle to Compromise on Medicare Bill,
N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2003, at Al (discussing the Senate's revised bill to deny
prescription drug benefits to people who are eligible for both Medicare and Medicaid).
See generally KATZ, supra note 15 (containing exhaustive documentation of
the down-sizing of the public and private safety net).
For a discussion on the background and purposes of the proposed reforms,
see Ann Morales Olazabal & Andrew J. Foti, Consumer Bankruptcy Reform and 11
U.S.C. §707(b): A Case-Based Analysis, 12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 317 (2003).
See H.R. 975, Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
of 2003, 108th Cong. § 102 (2003).
36 THERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN, & JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK,
THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT (2000).
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describes, the reforms have frequently been clothed in the
language of neo-liberal economics - "moral hazard,"
"transaction cost," and "efficiency" - allowing business
advocates to characterize them as merely technical
amendments to existing law.37
The scope of safety net protections is always political:
Employers argue that compensation is too costly while
employees argue the reverse. How much cost is "too much" or
"too little" cannot be determined by economics, but is rather a
focus of moral politics. Thus, the use of the language of
economics merely disguises a political choice made in the heat
of political exchange by making it appear to be logical, natural,
scientific, and "efficient."
In view of the conflicting claims about these safety net
reforms, how have the needy fared? Contributors to this
symposium have much to say about the consequences of these
new policies. In the next section, I describe the quality of the
safety net with particular emphasis on two important groups -
low-wage workers in the flexible-labor market and poor,
mother-only families.
III. THE SAFETY NET AND THE NEW LABOR MARKET
Most remarkable about the recent changes in American
welfare policies is the degree of consensus on the fundamental
strategy - more work for the poor and conditional benefits for
the employed to increase the "efficiency" of their work. Law
downsizing the most important poverty relief programs for poor
families was enacted with the signature of a Democratic
president, and the formula guiding reforms - time limits and
quick entry into the labor market - has been widely supported
by both liberals and conservatives even when there is
disagreement about details. Many other welfare state reforms -
bankruptcy, unemployment compensation, workers
compensation, Medicare and Medicaid reform - have reflected
similar agreement in principle even when there is sharp
disagreement over details.'
37 Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers' Compensation
"Reform", 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657 (1998).
As Handler noted many years ago in his perceptive analysis of evolving
welfare policy, liberals have shifted their position over time from opposing work for
women on welfare to supporting work. The shift has been explained, he notes, as a
response to the growing numbers of non-poor and working poor women with children in
the labor market. See Joel F. Handler, "Constructing the Political Spectacle": The
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President Clinton claimed that reforming social
provision in America represents something new, a so-called
"third way" - a market-friendly safety net that creates security
for working Americans and the needy. His third way rested on
three "cornerstones": "promot[ing] equal opportunity," an "ethic
of mutual responsibility," and "a new approach to governing
that empowers citizens to act for themselves."" The third
cornerstone is the most important and the most controversial.
Clinton and Great Britain Prime Minister Tony Blair argue
that the market-friendly social programs evolving in their
countries reduces poverty and economic insecurity by meeting
the needs of those whose needs are not being met by the labor
market. Robert Reich, formerly Clinton's Secretary of Labor,
commented that what distinguishes the "third way" from a
return to Reaganism and Thatcherism - the "old" way - is its
promise to meet the needs of "the economically displaced."0
Half a loaf won't do. The third-wayers must hold to their
commitment that "if people are willing to work hard they
should have a job that pays enough for them to live on."4' To
deliver on this commitment, workers must be educated or
trained, and if that is insufficient, says Reich, "their job should
be subsidized."" The problem the third way faces, according to
Reich, is funding.' Adequate support for workers and the
working poor together with job subsidies is costly, and neither
lenders nor taxpayers have been willing to support such
policies." Half a loaf is what Clinton achieved.
Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization, and Obligations in Social Welfare History,
56 BROOK. L. REV. 899 (1990). In many cases, work by women, still the primary family
caretakers, has not been voluntary and, therefore, provides little support for the
argument that destitute women with children should be required to do the same. Poor
women have always been required to work, because so few have received adequate
support from other sources, including welfare. A forceful argument might be made that
welfare, an updated minimum wage, greater child support or a child allowance would
benefit all working poor women in place of the present strategy that reduces all to the
same low common denominator of low-wage labor and family insecurity.
' Democratic Leadership Council, New Democrats Online, About the Third
Way, June 1, 1998, available at http:/www.ndol.org/
ndol ci.cfm?kaid=128&subid=187&contentid=895. The third way philosophy rejects the
'politics of social abandonment" that shifts too much market risk to employees,
consumers, and other citizens, and the "politics of entitlement" that reduces flexibility
required by a competitive market. Id.
40 Robert B. Reich, We Are All Third Wayers Now, AMERICAN PROSPECT,
Mar./Apr. 1999, at 46.
41 Id.
42 Id.
43 Id.
44Id.
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Historian Michael Katz offers a less favorable
assessment of these changes in the welfare state. He claims
that citizenship is being altered, reducing the protection from
insecurity for individuals in order to guarantee flexibility and
"efficiency" for businesses and employers. Citizenship, in his
words, has become "marketized."4 Katz argues that new social
policies reflect retrenchment, a return to the pre-New Deal
meaning of welfare that forced most of the poor and
economically insecure into the labor market.4' Clinton's claim to
a "third way" is suspect from the outset, because many of its
specific policies emphasizing work and self-reliance derive from
the centuries-old philosophy of public welfare that relied on the
labor market and left most poor persons without an adequate
safety net.
A critical element of third way social provision is its
promotion of "active labor market" policies. 7 Active labor
market strategies help individual workers adapt to the labor
market. They include assistance for workers to help them
adjust to the increasingly flexible conditions of labor, and
training for the unemployed to help them gain access to the
labor market. What kind of assistance is offered, over what
period of time, and on what conditions, depends on
assumptions about the causes of job loss or unemployment, the
work ethic (moral deservingness) of the beneficiaries, and the
benefit to society from public support for a particular quality of
social citizenship. In the United States, where the poor, the
unemployed, the bankrupt, or the injured worker is typically
portrayed by the dominant conservative view as potentially
dependent, unmotivated, and undeserving, policies incorporate
45 KATZ, supra note 15, 341-59.
46 Id. at 9-32. Katz describes the steady rise of pro-market policies,
devolution, and privatization ideology over many decades, deviating further and
further from the meaning of "welfare" that prevailed during the New Deal and
encompassed security for all citizens. Rollbacks in federal spending, supported by the
emerging rhetoric of devolution and downsizing, began under Democratic President
Carter and accelerated under subsequent Republican Presidents whose explicit moral
politics targeted welfare state entitlements and promoted fiscal conservatism.
Calculated strategies of research, public debate, and ideologically focused politics by
conservatives coalesced in successful presidential campaigns, and they eventually drew
Democrats toward a more conservative social agenda. Others have detailed the failure
of labor unions to mobilize potential opposition and the role that race has played in
dividing potential economic allies in the working class. See, e.g., THOMAS FERGUSON &
JOEL ROGERS, RIGHT TURN: THE DECLINE OF THE DEMOCRATS AND THE FUTURE OF
AMERICAN POLITICS (1986); THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN
REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1991).
47 See Handler, supra note 19, at 770.
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discipline in the form of conditions to limit "overuse" of
benefits. Overall they are far less generous than in most
European societies.'"
Gaps in the safety net have become increasingly
apparent as dramatic changes in the labor market have
reduced the availability and adequacy of private welfare in the
form of secure income, a prospect of rising wages over the
length of a career, and fringe benefits, especially for low-wage
workers. 9 Two radically distinct tiers are emerging in the labor
market, one tier enjoying relatively stable employment, an
expectation of rising wages, and adequate benefits.' The other,
low-wage tier not only earns much lower entry-level wages but
experiences other disadvantages as well, such as the lack of
benefits or job security." Most importantly, as Annette
Bernhardt and her colleagues have shown, many low-wage jobs
are no longer the bottom rung of a career ladder that will lead
to higher wages and greater security later in life.2 Those who
begin in many lower-tier jobs will experience little career
mobility. These jobs constitute a growing proportion of the
labor market, and they are prevalent in service industries such
as retail trade, personal services, entertainment and
recreation, and in lower-level business and repair services.
Growth of low-wage careers has not been limited to
traditionally low-wage service sector jobs. They are
increasingly the reality in deunionized manufacturing
industries and among workers with some college experience.'
Instability in wages and jobs is the reality in the new,
flexible labor market. Contingent labor is one source of
instability, but only a small factor when compared with the
effects of restructured workplaces. Many of the causes are
evident, among them subcontracting and outsourcing
production or services once performed as part of an integrated
4 See POVERTY, INEQUALITY AND INCOME DISTRIBUTION IN COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVE: THE LUXEMBOURG INCOME STUDY (Timothy M. Smeeding et al. eds.,
1990); PIERRE ROSANVALLON, THE NEW SOCIAL QUESTION: RETHINKING THE WELFARE
STATE (Barbara Harshav trans., 2000).
'9 See BERNHARDT ET AL., supra note 1, at 184-87. See also WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL ET AL., DOWNSIZING IN AMERICA: REALITY, CAUSES, AND CONSEQUENCES 258-
61 (2003); WORKING IN RESTRUCTURED WORKPLACES: CHALLENGES AND NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK (Daniel B. Cornfield et al. eds., 2001).
50 BERNHARDT, ETAL., supra note 1, at 1-5.
51 Id. at 1-6.
52 Id. at 154-55.
Id. at 171.
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business.' The outsourced work is often nonunion, contingent
upon the particular short-term subcontract, and narrowly
specialized and isolated from other parts of the business - all of
which limit the mobility of employees." Within firms, the same
process of separation and isolation is taking place so that, for
example, corporate headquarters and the call center associated
with customer service may be in different states. The call
center itself may be subdivided by client type, and cross
training of workers limited. Team production, popular in many
industries, may isolate groups of workers, potentially limiting
mobility to higher-level jobs. Such forms of segmentation may
increase efficiency but they have a cost for workers because
they limit their mobility and increase the likelihood of job loss
when the particular function or service is altered or
eliminated.6
The American welfare state has responded by offering
some new training and education programs,57 but funding has
never been adequate for these programs. The emphasis on
supply-side welfare to cure employment insecurity (with rare
exceptions such as the Family and Medical Leave Act' and the
modest increases in the minimum wage in the 1990s") is
consistent with the "third way" philosophy of helping workers
to adapt while leaving the labor market itself relatively
unregulated.
Bernhardt argues that a supply-side approach leaves
enormous gaps in the safety net that can only be closed by
addressing both the demand for low-wage workers and the
employment relationship.' Only demand-side policies can
recreate jobs that will eventually lead to higher wages and
greater employment stability. Additional skills alone do not
guarantee wage or job stability or an upward career. Thus the
goal must be to create "external" career ladders - secure
mobility outside the firm - and for this, a change in job market
structure will be required to create the possibility of
advancement and portability of benefits while moving between
54 Id. at 188-92.
55 BERNHARDT, ET AL., supra note 1, at 188-92.
56 Id.
5' See, e.g., Workforce Investment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2945 (2000).
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
'9 CNN, Clinton Signs Minimum Wage Increase, Aug. 20, 1996, at
http://www.cnn.com/IJS/9608/20/minimum.wage.sign/ (last visited Feb. 16, 2004).
60 BERNHARDT, ET AL., supra note 1, at 191-98.
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firms." Flexibility permits rapid change, but matching workers
and jobs will continue to be a problem unless mobility and
movement of workers from one job to the next is coordinated.
Low-wage employment within a single firm is increasingly a
dead end. Offering additional education to workers does not
address the problem created by the segmentation of the low-
wage labor market because there can be no upward career
within a firm when there is no career ladder. Finally, because
the work performed in low-wage jobs is valuable, the goal
should not be to give every worker a college education or
lifetime job tenure, but to make low-wage and "flexible"
employment a viable career option.
Solutions to these problems call in part for legislative
solutions that address the need for external career ladders, but
also will require reforming the employment relationship to
create new career possibilities within firms whose low-wage
jobs have the disadvantages of the lower tier. Bernhardt says
that reforming the employment relationship will require
"sectoral" solutions, that is, an agreement among traditional
competitors in a business sector to adopt high-road
employment practices." Under such an agreement, no employer
bears the cost alone and all employers reap the productivity
gains of creating a reliable supply of labor. Such sectoral
agreements will require the resources of unions, local
government, educational institutions, and other supporting
actors to supply expertise in education or management,
regulatory flexibility, tax breaks or other subsidies, union
support, and untapped sources of trainable workers (such as
underemployed low-wage workers or welfare-to-work
recipients) needed for long term, self-sustaining increases in
productivity.'6
Safety net policies are moving the opposite direction
from the reforms needed under Bernhardt's analysis. As
described earlier, workers' compensation coverage has been
reduced in an ongoing struggle between employers, unions, and
community advocates. Unemployment compensation, also a
state-administered program, has been downsized over the same
time period. Between 1981 and 1987, Katz reports, "forty-four
states raised work and earnings requirements for
61 id.
62 Id.
63 Id.
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unemployment insurance and added criteria for
disqualification."' For example, many states expanded the
definition of "voluntary quit" and most barred all benefits to
workers involved in lockouts or strikes.' Katz concludes that
"[als in other parts of the welfare state, policy became more
punitive - its instrument for shaping behavior the stick, not
the carrot."'
Similarly, Professor Elizabeth Warren and her
collaborators have reached conclusions about the claims for
bankruptcy reforms that resemble the labor market reforms
emphasizing educating, retraining, and disciplining workers.
According to her research, the source of rising numbers of
bankruptcies is not a lack of discipline or the expensive tastes
of American consumers, but the increasing vulnerability of
typical households to sudden changes in income or debt - the
increasing number of bread winners who lose a job, the growing
number of divorced women, and the growing number of
individuals with overwhelming, uninsured medical expenses. 7
Another vulnerable group are those lured to borrow beyond
their means through aggressive, federally-underwritten, high-
risk lending practices.'
The federal welfare reform law passed in 1996,
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,' replaced the New
Deal-inspired Aid to Families with Dependent Children with a
block grant program and freed the states from many of their
obligations under the prior law to provide benefits to poor
mothers and their families. The new law incorporates
conditions intended to move welfare recipients quickly into
work to encourage an end to dependency." The stereotype is
that welfare recipients lack a work ethic. To counter this, the
reformers placed a lifetime limit on welfare to discourage
backsliding into dependency and to promote employment in
KATZ, supra note 15, at 225.
' Id. at 226.
6 Id.
67 ELIZABETH WARREN & AMELIA WARREN TYAGI, THE TWO-INCOME TRAP:
WHY MIDDLE-CLASS MOTHERS AND FATHERS ARE GOING BROKE (2003); see also
Elizabeth Warren, The Growing Threat to Middle Class Families, 69 BROOK. L. REV.
401 (2004).
KATZ, supra note 15, at 315-16.
69 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 601-619
(2000)).
70 See Kost & Munger, supra note 22, at 79-85.
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any available job - however poorly paid or insecure - on the
theory that it will be the first rung on a career ladder leading
to self-sufficiency for the properly motivated worker." States
have been left free to adopt still more stringent time limits as
well as conditions requiring job seeking, marriage promotion,
and limitation of child bearing."
The conditions built into welfare by the architects of
reform emerged from moral politics legitimated by the myth of
the poor, black, teenage welfare mother with many children
who remains on welfare for many years.73 This image of the
typical welfare recipient is a myth in every respect. Fewer than
one in ten recipients are teenagers." A typical welfare family
has fewer than two children." Most recipients receive welfare
for relatively short periods of time, many of them cycling
between welfare and work that is short term,76 and without
either benefits or security.77
Equally flawed is the assumption of welfare reformers
that the low-wage job market will sustain anyone who seeks a
job. The jobs available to welfare recipients are almost
exclusively in low-wage service industries, and, as we have
seen, these "low-road" jobs lead nowhere. As the economy
generally expanded in the 1990s, the competition for work in
many low-wage sectors remained high, and the wages have not
See § 101, 110 Stat. at 2110 (congressional findings).
72 Consider, for example, the differences among state programs that
implement the most important family requirements of the federal welfare reform -
child support enforcement, domestic violence exceptions, and encouragement of family
formation. Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary
Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121 (2002).
73 HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 9, at 3-11; RACE AND THE POLITICS OF
WELFARE REFORM 323-25 (Sanford F. Schram et al. eds., 2003); ANNE MARIE CAMMISA,
FROM RHETORIC TO REFORM?: WELFARE POLICY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1998).
74 HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 9, at 45.
75 id.
76 Id. at 46.
77 Unemployment compensation programs treat many of the reasons that
force low-wage workers to leave employment, such as the health of a child or childcare
problems and other family-related reasons, as a "voluntary quit" for which no benefits
are paid. Short-term employees may be disqualified on other grounds as well. See
Handler, supra note 19, at 789. In recent years, unemployment compensation programs
have provided benefits to about one-third of all workers who lost jobs. See KATZ, supra
note 15, at 226 n.77. For the poorest working women with families and no spouse to
rely on, welfare becomes the only available form of unemployment compensation. See
Diana Pearce, Welfare is Not for Women: Why the War on Poverty Cannot Conquer the
Feminization of Poverty, in WOMEN, THE STATE AND WELFARE 265, 271 (Linda Gordon
ed., 1990).
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risen in proportion to the growth in the economy."8 As
Bernhardt describes, most of the available low-wage jobs in
food preparation, cleaning, and maintenance offer no benefits,
are short term, and do not place incumbents on a career
ladder." These are the jobs available to welfare recipients who
are required to work as a condition of receiving welfare.
Further complicating their job search, many recipients have
multiple barriers to employment such as limited education,
lack of transportation and child care, and health problems. The
latest reports on "leavers" by the Urban Institute show that a
significant proportion who leave welfare for work eventually
return to welfare - as always - because the available jobs will
not support them.'
If the job market is so flawed, why have welfare rolls
declined precipitously, allowing the architects of reform to
declare their policies a success?' Welfare rolls have declined
not only because individuals leave the rolls, but also because
individuals who need assistance and may be eligible have been
discouraged from applying by aggressive diversion programs."
It does not take long for word to spread that applicants are
hassled and discouraged from applying. Long after the policy
has changed, needy applicants may continue to seek other
alternatives such as private charities, soup kitchens, relatives,
or underground (and illegal) economic pursuits. Thus, if
welfare was intended to help poor families avoid the harmful
consequences of raising children under such stress, it has
78 Indeed, until the late 1990s, real wages for the lowest paid workers had
fallen over two decades. See Burtless & Smeeding, supra note 5, at 41.
" BERNHARDT, ET AL., supra note 1, at 164-72.
Pamela Loprest, How are Families that Left Welfare Doing: A Comparison
of Early and Recent Welfare Leavers, NEW FEDERALISM: NATIONAL SURVEY OF
AMERICA'S FAMILIES, Apr. 2001 (Urban Institute, No. B-36); see also Leslie Kaufman,
Are Those Leaving Welfare Better Off Now? Yes and No, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2003, at
B1.
81 Many former recipients who left welfare lost benefits for failure to comply
with the rules. Some of these recipients may find work, but lack the transitional
benefits afforded recipients and, thus, have poorer chances of remaining at a job.
Recipients must provide documentation, appear for interviews, contact job training or
job supervision centers, and report to welfare administrators regularly, while often
coping with problematic transportation, child care, and medical coverage at the same
time. Failure to follow the rules can result in sanctions and, potentially, termination of
welfare. The most recent studies suggest that about one-third of those who left the
welfare rolls did so because they were sanctioned. See Ladonna Pavetti & Dan Bloom,
State Sanctions and Time Limits, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 245 (Rebecca M.
Blank & Ronald Haskins eds., 2001).
82 SCHRAM, supra note 3, at 196. See also Reynolds v. Guiliani, 35 F. Supp.
2d. 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
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become counterproductive. Indeed, Professor Joel Handler
concludes that the "third way" has in practice returned to the
"old way."' He argues that the third way leads ineluctably to
familiar patterns of intermittent employment, inadequate
income, and bureaucratic disentitlement, as it always has,
because the welfare reforms are ultimately driven by their
mischaracterization of "undeserving" welfare recipients and
mistaken assumptions about dependency.'
To sum up, the inadequacies of the public-private
welfare state are becoming more severe. A low-wage, dead-end,
lower tier in the job market is growing - including not only
welfare recipients but also working- and middle-class wage-
earners who have lost secure employment. In response, the pro-
market reformers of the welfare state argue that greater
flexibility is required, and that workers must adapt to the
changing labor market. Although third way policies promise to
close the gaps left by the job market, they have failed to
address the lack of decent work that offers an opportunity for
self-sufficiency - and no relief is in sight. The gaps in the safety
net have become truly enormous. The risks faced by the lowest
paid workers and the poor are large and have devastating
consequences.
Conservatives respond that the effects do not matter
because the new, restrictive, market-friendly policies are just.
To fully understand changes in American welfare, we must
recognize that the moral politics of welfare reflect sexism,
racism, and class conflict that underlie the continuing struggle
between economic actors. New Deal programs struck a balance
between employers who wanted maximum control over labor,
southern white politicians who wanted black agricultural
workers excluded from pension and welfare programs, and the
emerging movement for greater, universal economic security to
protect citizens from the ravages of the labor market. Today,
changes in the safety net to meet the demands of the global
economy, indeed the characterization of the reasons for change
as demands of the market rather than demands of particular
83 Handler, supra note 19, at 765.
94 See Handler, supra note 19, at 787-92; Evelyn Z. Brodkin, Inside the
Welfare Contract: Discretion and Accountability in State Welfare Administration, 71
SOC. SERVICE REV. 1 (1997). See also SHARON HAYS, FLAT BROKE WITH CHILDREN:
WOMEN IN THE AGE OF WELFARE REFORM ch.4 (2003) (showing initial enthusiasm
among caseworkers for welfare reform goals was replaced by discouragement and
indifference after encountering insuperable barriers to implementation).
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economic actors, result from a new set of struggles between
multinational corporations, domestic entrepreneurs, and
conservative ideologues on one hand, and on the other hand,
advocates of labor and the poor, among others, who seek
greater security and equity in times of rapid change and
economic instability.
IV. BEYOND THE THIRD WAY: RIGHTS, SELF-HELP, AND "DEEPER
DEMOCRACY"
If America's safety net is failing, what could reverse the
damage done by the welfare state's decline? Rights have been
one historical remedy for economic inequities. Professor Shep
Melnick has described the highly successful movement to
expand welfare rights through litigation in which courts
stripped away state qualifications on welfare.' A strongly
universalistic meaning of welfare moved the courts in the
1960s and 1970s to see federal statutory law as a mandate for
broader social provision. Courts viewed many conditions placed
on welfare by the states as rooted in bigotry and intolerance.'
That tide of judicial interpretation has now turned. In the view
of many contemporary courts, the ideology of moral
responsibility and the market legitimates reinscribing limits on
welfare based upon personal character. Moreover, the courts
have ignored the racial loading of many of these conditions. 7
For several decades, conservatives at the federal level
have successfully pushed to eliminate federal entitlements in
order to give state and local governments a freer hand. Block
grants created under Presidents Nixon and Reagan reduced the
rights of beneficiaries to claim entitlements.' Elimination of
the New Deal program of relief for poor families in 1996
explicitly targeted welfare entitlements . Conservatives
continue to seek ways to give employers and businesses greater
flexibility, necessarily reducing the mandates protecting
R. SHEP MELNICK, BETWEEN THE LINES: INTERPRETING WELFARE RIGHTS
(1994).
Id.
87 DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND
THE MEANING OF LIBERTY (1997).
88 Nancy Morawetz, A Due Process Primer: Litigating Government Benefits
Cases in the Block Grant Era, CLEARINGHOUSE REV., June 1996, at 97, 97-104.
Michele Estrin Gilman, Legal Accountability in an Era of Privatized
Welfare, 89 CAL. L. REV. 569 (2001).
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employees and consumers.' The Supreme Court, dominated by
conservative Justices, has given full effect to this trend.'
Yet rights have continued to play an important role
even as the welfare state shrinks. The architects of a reduced
welfare state are learning that scaling down rights is not the
same as scaling up for several reasons: rights advocates are in
place; ending federal entitlements does not end state
entitlements (states vary widely in this respect); and recipients
of state welfare benefits are mobilized to defend their rights as
citizens. In New York, for example, lawyers for the poor have
successfully protected some of the remaining federal
entitlements for welfare recipients and immigrants, and
similarly continue to hold officials accountable for rights under
state law. Lawyers elsewhere have also continued to win
enforcement of rights to state welfare benefits. 3
We can hope for continuing support for some extremely
important programs, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC). With rare exceptions, the EITC has gained bipartisan
support.' It has been the most important anti-poverty and low-
wage support program in recent years, though not well known
among members of the public, and its very political invisibility
may be an asset. Support should remain strong unless the
EITC becomes a target of conservative rhetoric following the
recent denial of the child tax credit for low-wage workers -
essentially an increase in their EITC - who were stigmatized
as non-taxpayers. If such rhetoric gains support, the EITC
could be jeopardized. Although the minimum wage was
modestly increased under President Clinton, few further
increases are likely in the foreseeable future.
Bernhardt and her colleagues concluded that low-wage,
unstable employment would be tolerable only if institutions
were created to support "external" career ladders and job
replacement - if institutions supplied benefits and income, and
See KATZ, supra note 15, at 195-231, 257-92, 348.
91 See also THE REHNQUIST COURT: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON THE RIGHT
(Herman Schwartz ed., 2002).
92 See Reynolds v. Guiliani, 35 F. Supp. 2d 331 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); Aliessa ex
rel. Fayad v. Novello, 96 N.Y.2d 418, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 730 N.Y.S.2d 1 (2001). But for
notable defeats that reflect the successful weakening of entitlements, see Brukhman v.
Guiliani, 94 N.Y.2d. 387, 727 N.E.2d 116 (2000); Capers v. Guiliani, 677 253 A.D.2d.
630, N.Y.S.2d 353 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2001).
93 See, e.g., Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Weston v. Cassata, 37 P.3d 469
(Colo. Ct. App. 2001).
See Christopher Howard, Protean Lure for the Working Poor: Party
Competition and the Earned Income Tax Credit, 9 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 404 (1995).
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if the employment relationship changed in "low track" jobs to
become sustainable through better wages and expanded
opportunities to improve economically. Handler and
Hasenfeld's exhaustive review of the most effective innovations
for the lowest wage and welfare workers led them to conclude,
like Bernhardt, that at least two major policy changes are
needed to deliver on President Clinton's promise to "make work
pay:" first, a commitment to full employment, namely a job for
everyone who wants one, and second, universal, adequate
health and unemployment insurance. In addition, the services
already promised to families and workers under so-called third
way policies, such as training, education, day care, and child
support, must be sustained and effective - not the "myth and
ceremony" typical of social provision by many state programs."
These recommendations are sensible conclusions from
well-established experience with welfare and low-wage benefits
innovations, and they represent a return to at least one feature
of the welfare state seemingly rejected by the consensus "third
way," namely entitlements. Some of these benefits will not be
means tested (universal health care, child allowances,
"external" career supports) or will have no conditions except
low current income (EITC, minimum wage, child care).
Benefits will require federal standards for services, and ideally
such standards will be benchmarked - ratcheted upwards as
knowledge of better means of service delivery increases (worker
support centers, quality child care, intensive support for the
young or hard to employ).
New entitlements are not likely to be created without
the emergence of a strong national political base.' At the
national level, there is some support for sustained federal
funding and adjustment of the services/obligations balance, but
the ongoing struggle is not moving in the direction of a better
safety net for welfare recipients, low-wage workers, or the
increasingly insecure middle class.
Some have argued that even if new entitlements are
created, their promise is inevitably contradictory. Rights are
95 HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 9, at 213-25.
Francis Piven and Richard Cloward suggest as much, but for all the
reasons that they have been writing about for years, this base is unlikely to emerge
soon. See FRANCIS Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, POOR PEOPLE'S MOVEMENTS:
WHY THEY SUCCEED, HOW THEY FAIL 196 (1979). See also, SCHRAM, supra note 3;
CHARLES NOBLE, WELFARE AS WE KNEW IT: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
WELFARE STATE (1997); MARTIN GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE,
MEDIA, AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY POLICY (1999).
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incapacitating because they are presumed, unrealistically, to
be final. 7 Thus, they undercut political participation. Rights
are expensive, diverting resources from benefits and services.
Formal mobilization of rights may be difficult for the poor,
economically stressed, or those with limited education. Yet,
even in the absence of formal mobilization, rights can
transform individual's lives - people behave and relate in
different ways in the presence of rights, sometimes to their
great benefit. 8
For these reasons, activists, organizers, and scholars
have focused increasing attention and energy on the
importance of enduring local economic and political alliances
that will rebuild or replace the safety net. Proposals fall into
three overlapping groups: collective self-help in the private
labor market, extending the state through privatization, and
creating a local, more egalitarian welfare state. Each is
examined in turn.
A. Getting It Together: Collective Self-help
The number of workers and poor who are vulnerable in
the new economy is so large that one solution seems obvious:
collective action to meet the needs that the labor, consumer,
housing, medical care, and other private markets have failed to
provide. Current conditions have stimulated numerous projects
to obtain collectively what the safety net and the job market do
not offer to individuals - better wages, needed benefits, and
greater security. The projects extend a long tradition of
organizing on behalf of those at the economic margins, but, as
William Simon observes in his examination of the community
economic development movement, grassroots organizing has
flourished for the past twenty-five years since conservatives
97 Mark Tushnet, The Critique of Rights, 47 SMU L. REV. 23 (1993). See also
PIVEN & CLOWARD, supra note 98.
98 KimberI Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331
(1988); Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from
the Women's Movement, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY: FOUNDATIONS 507 (D. Kelly
Weisberg ed., 1993); DAVID M. ENGEL & FRANK W. MUNGER, RIGHTS OF INCLUSION:
LAW AND IDENTITY IN THE LIFE STORIES OF AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES (2003)
(demonstrating that rights interact in beneficial ways with identity); MICHAEL W.
MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF LEGAL
MOBILIZATION (1994) (showing that the effects of rights depends on context).
[Vol. 69:2
HOW CAN WE SAVE THE SAFETY NET?
targeted further growth in the welfare state and began to
dismantle existing programs.'
Speakers at this symposium highlighted extraordinary
successes in transforming low-wage and insecure work by
supplementing the wages and benefits provided by jobs."'
Working Today, the organization founded in New York by one
of the symposium speakers, Sara Horowitz, innovates creative
strategies to improve employment for members of the one-third
of the labor force comprised of "freelancers, consultants,
independent contractors, temps, part-timers, contingent
employees, and the self-employed.... Members are drawn from
the New York area nonprofit, finance, technology, media and
advertising, and arts and entertainment sectors, hardly the
public's image of the needy or impoverished "dependent" poor.
Yet these members of the labor force are among those described
by Bernhardt and others as economically insecure because of
the contingent or transient relationship to employers. Through
a subsidiary, the Freelancer's Union, members gain access to
health and disability insurance and pension plans, benefits
their jobs cannot provide them. Adopting one of the strategies
recommended by Bernhardt, the Freelancer's Union provides
an "external" structure that sustains employees
notwithstanding the insecurities created by their flexible
employment relationships.
Working Partnerships, USA, a California not-for-profit,
has created an even more ambitious project to provide job and
benefit continuity for both low-wage and highly-paid temporary
workers in California's Silicon Valley. Established as a "high-
road temporary staffing firm," the Working Partnerships
Membership Association guarantees access to health benefits,
provides training, and operates well-supported job placement
services.'2 Established by the South Bay Labor Council,
Working Partnerships draws on the resources of its members,
but also benefits from additional support from labor unions and
9' WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE COMMUNITY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
MOVEMENT: LAW, BUSINESS, AND THE NEW SOCIAL POLICY (2001). See also PAUL
OSTERMAN, SECURING PROSPERITY: THE AMERICAN LABOR MARKET: HOW IT HAS
CHANGED AND WHAT TO Do ABOUT IT (1999).
'oo These speakers included Sara Horowitz, Founder and Executive Director of
Working Today, and Professor Jennifer Gordon, Fordham University School of Law.
I"' See Working Today, Inc., About Us, at http://www.workingtoday.org/about/
(last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
102 See Working Partnerships Membership Association, Who We Are, at
http://www.wpmembers.org/who/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
20041
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
large foundations, such as Ford, Hewlett, and the Campaign
for Human Development.
Among the most successful and extraordinary examples
of self-help organizing is Make the Road By Walking, an
organization of immigrant day-workers on Long Island, New
York created through the brilliant leadership of another
symposium speaker, Professor Jennifer Gordon. By working to
establish fair treatment of day workers, the organization meets
the needs of low-wage and often undocumented workers whom
local businesses and homeowners often exploit. At the same
time, the organization meets a growing need for low-wage labor
in affluent communities, work for which there is no reliable,
indigenous supply of workers. By leveraging mutual interest in
a reliable labor supply and by astute political organizing,
Gordon's organization was able to gain community support for
the workers' goals and, in particular, to obtain passage of
legislation that protected the workers' right to wages. '
Successful projects like Working Today, Working
Partnerships, USA, and Make the Road By Walking have
similar characteristics, namely long-term commitment to
members, concern for the larger picture of economic security
rather than provision of a particular service, and, often, though
not always, resources beyond the means of the individual
members. Working Today represents the interests of skilled
workers who earn substantial wages when employed. In
contrast, the Working Partnerships Membership Association's
union and foundation affiliations were key in starting up and
sustaining an organization that serves low-wage workers. The
more limited the resources of individual members and their
families, the less likely the organization is to become self-
sustaining through their contributions alone, even when
members are stably employed. At the extreme, viable programs
for employment of welfare-to-work recipients are virtually all
externally supported by unions, foundations, or government
funding."'
103 Jennifer Gordon, We Make the Road by Walking: Immigrant Workers, The
Workplace Project, and the Struggle for Social Change, 30 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 407
(1995).
o Two of the most successful programs for employment of welfare-to-work,
the Consortium for Worker Education and Seedco, are established with union support
and quite similar to the groups described in the texts. See Steven Greenhouse, Job
Training that Works, and It's Free, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2003, § 10, at 1; Seedco, About
Us, available at http://www.seedco.org/about/overview/ (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
[Vol. 69:2
HOW CAN WE SAVE THE SAFETY NET?
Similar potential - with similar limitations - is
apparent from the record of the community economic
development movement that grew and declined with the local
participation requirements of urban redevelopment programs
of the 1940s and the Office of Economic Opportunity's
Community Action Program in the 1960s. The movement
focuses on creating self-sustaining and democratically governed
corporate service entities to provide services or capital
development to low-income and working poor communities.
These services include such initiatives as affordable housing,
employment training and benefits, or banking and financial
services.'
Overall, some of these projects have achieved stunning
successes. In spite of the successes, many fail and vast areas of
need remain. Careful assessment reveals substantial barriers
to organizing private self-help for the most vulnerable in the
new economy and, thus, the limited capacity of such projects to
supplement the welfare state's safety net.'
First, projects like Working Today rely opportunistically
on collective self-help in the labor market. Community
economic development (CED) organizations, similarly, rely on
networks of connection in relatively stable communities that
create a sense of shared identity and interest as well as the
capacity to support an organization that, in some cases,
capitalizes quite substantial projects. The key is having the
social capital to get organized and to give the group market
power, a capital not always available.
Even more striking are the limitations on the collective
capacity of the poorest and most insecure, namely welfare
recipients. Although many grassroots organizations of welfare
recipients and former recipients provide mutual support and
facilitate sharing information and connections, few are able to
expand the safety net for poor persons. Such grassroots
organizations often simply lack the resources to provide jobs or
benefits essential to support work. Ironically, they replicate the
dilemma of the poor person who is forced to turn to welfare
because the labor market does not offer adequate child care or
other resources to help them adapt to insecure, low-wage work.
Indeed, as Diana Pearce maintains, welfare is their
105 SIMON, supra note 99, at 7-13.
'0' Id. at 219-27.
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unemployment compensation.' 7 Fortunately, initial levels of
income or social capital, by themselves, do not determine
whether collective action is effective. Gordon's Make the Road
By Walking project is an illustration of the market power of a
financially poor group whose social capital was supplemented
by the presence of an inspired organizer who tapped the
workers' own potential and drew in unlikely allies on the basis
of economic self-interest. But welfare recipients seldom have
the right kind of social capital for such a movement - indeed,
they depend upon welfare not only because they are
economically poor, but also because they lack social capital that
many other poor families can rely upon.' Plenty of grass-roots
poverty organizations exist, but they yield mutual aid rather
than market power, and many depend on external funding and
organization. Even with the assistance of private foundations
and charities, such organizations meet only a fraction of the
need for a safety net.
Second, the projects have the potential weaknesses of all
organizations whose mission is representing the interests of a
membership - flagging member support, especially after initial
successes are followed by difficult battles to sustain external
support or to defend ground won in the legislative, political, or
economic arena.'9 In addition, by definition members are
relatively poor and susceptible to the temptation to use group
victories to leverage individual fortunes rather than return
gains on investment of time, energy, or capital to the common
pool. Simon argues that there are limits to the altruism we can
expect of the members of grassroots economic movements."'
Individuals perceive the purpose of their participation as
leveraging up, not giving back.
Third, local economic activism often focuses on too
narrow a base to sustain real change. Limiting the
organization's focus to what David Rusk calls the "inside game"
of local politics, or equivalently, a single employer or small
1o' Pearce, supra note 77, at 271.
'08 See generally Julia R. Henly, Informal Support Networks and the
Maintenance of Low-Wage Jobs, in LABORING BELOW THE LINE: THE NEW
ETHNOGRAPHY OF POVERTY, LOW-WAGE WORK, AND SURVIVAL IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
(Frank Munger ed., 2002). See also WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS, supra note 8.
09 JENNIFER GORDON, THE CAMPAIGN FOR THE UNPAID WAGES PROHIBITION
ACT: LATINO IMMIGRANTS CHANGE NEW YORK WAGE LAW (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Working Paper No.4, Sept. 1999) (illustrating this aspect of the
dilemma posed by rights).
11o SIMON, supra note 99, at 223-25.
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community of employers, may fail as a strategy for significant
change.' Local governments and their communities lack the
resources and power for meaningful redistribution. Companies
are limited by competition within markets that often extend
beyond residential, in particular urban, communities. Again,
Make the Road By Walking provides a rare example of a
grassroots movement that was successful at the "outside
game," that is, in a regional labor market.
Finally, Simon observes that almost all grassroots
activism by low-income people, including successful community
economic development organizations that have long track
records of self-sustaining achievement, depend greatly on
external institutional support. The support includes not only
laws that foster, protect, and even favor community-based
nonprofits, but also includes the redistribution of wealth and
credit by banks, foundations, and, most importantly, the state.
The federal government has continued to favor not-for-profit
organizations that pursue community economic development
projects such as affordable housing, and in many policy areas
public-private partnerships are gaining favor. Whether these
serve unmet safety net needs depends in part on the conditions
attached to funding. In addressing the needs of low-wage labor
and the poor through the private sector, federal funding has
focused on services that prepare individuals for the job market
rather than on poverty relief or the job market itself.
B. Extending the State Through Privatization
A common response by those concerned about the
rollback of the welfare state has been to decry the privatization
of the safety net through the contracting out of safety net
services and the devolution of safety net programs to the
private market through devices such as "managed
competition," individual social security accounts, or outright
withdrawal of the public sector from particular programs,
otherwise known as deregulation."'
Ironically, the vast majority of Americans rely on
private welfare in the form of fringe benefits for medical
insurance and pensions provided through the private labor
.. Id. at 225-27.
"1 Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Privatization and the Democracy Problem in
Globalization: Making Markets More Accountable Through Administrative Law, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1477 (2001).
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market. Further, the public-private welfare state has always
relied on not-for-profit charities to provide an essential third
component in services for poor persons. "3 Significant support
for such services comes from private philanthropy, but
government has long funded a large proportion of the cost,
relying on these organizations to provide services instead of
providing them through more costly, or politically vulnerable,
public administration. Indeed, the dependence of private
providers on government is increasing."4 The attraction of
cooperative arrangements is that private providers,
particularly not-for-profits, often offer a combination of
commitment, experience, and low-cost that government
administered programs cannot match.
Privatization has become one of the pillars of new
conservatism, and there has been a rush to privatize public
welfare. Now, proposals for managed medical care to replace
Medicaid entitlements, private social security accounts to
replace entitlement to fixed retirement benefits, and
contracted-out welfare services and administration to replace
that done by the government, promise to harness the power of
the private market to meet needs while keeping costs at an
efficient level. 15 Of course, such proposals mean that the
intended beneficiaries will bear the risk of an underperforming
market due to market declines, unresponsiveness to consumer
preferences, or outright corruption - all the factors that have
always disadvantaged consumers and poor consumers in
particular.
Private participation in public welfare has been
aggressively promoted by the current administration." Welfare
reform has stimulated expansion of an already vibrant
grassroots and nonprofit scene as existing providers have
113 KATZ, supra note 15, at 13 (citing studies that estimate the value of welfare
services provided by not-for-profits during the mid-1990s at over $568 billion).
114 Id. at 144-45.
115 Id. at 144-47. For a discussion of the justifications for the recent Medicare
reforms that mandated experimentation with privatization, see Robert Pear, A Final
Push in Congress: The Overview, Sweeping Medicare Change Wins Approval in
Congress: President Claims a Victory, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2003, at Al; Milt
Freudenheim, Medicare Plan for Competition Faces Hurdles, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
2003, at Al.
.1 See U.S. Department of Health and Human Services: Administration for
Children and Family, The Faith-Based and Community Initiative, at
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/fbci/index.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2004); White
House, Charitable Choice: The Facts, at http://whitehouse.gov/government/fbci/
guidance/charitable.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2004).
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responded to opportunities to expand their role. In addition, a
host of first-timers - new for-profit corporations, converted
government contractors, as well as newly-minted not-for-profits
- have rushed to respond. Many now benefit from large
contracts with local welfare administrators anxious to expand
their capacity to manage the demands of welfare-to-work.
However, many advocates for the poor view the
proposals to privatize welfare with skepticism. Some of the
skepticism grows from the fact that services previously
provided by public employees are being contracted out to
private organizations with little provision for accountability."'
Particularly sharp criticism has been directed at the Bush
administration's promotion of "charitable choice," which
emphasizes giving an important role to faith-based providers.
To opponents, trusting faith-based providers to extend the
state's capacity to provide a safety net seems to risk
undermining constitutional protection for a woman's right to
choose, which some faith-based organizations oppose, and
discrimination against service recipients who do not conform to
the life-style or religious preferences of a faith-based provider."'
A leading minority-rights advocate has recently made
the discussion of privatization more complex by advocating
careful reconsideration of public-private cooperation with faith-
based organizations to provide basic welfare state benefits and
services. Professor Martha Minow"' observes that as a society
we have always favored complex public-private solutions to
meeting our communal and individual needs for welfare. The
expansion of private involvement in poverty programs and
other areas expresses the legitimate promise of private
providers not only to fill gaps in the safety net but also to
provide better quality services. Faith-based providers cannot
"fill in the holes of a gouged safety net,"'29 but they can provide
better quality, specifically, "more meaningful public assistance
with strong community ties" in contrast to many existing
public programs that are "dehumanizing and incompetent."12'
"' Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability and
Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work Services, 28
FORD. URB. L.J. 1559 (2001).
118 See Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 324 F.3d 880 (7th
Cir. 2003)
119 MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC
GOOD (2002).
120 Id. at 113.
121 Id. at 116.
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Moreover, private providers are necessary because "[r]eliance
on public support is inadequate, practically, because it will not
be enough and because struggles over the scope of public aid to
the poor pit competing visions of the good against one another
and against individual liberties."" Thus, she concludes,
We cannot leave the needs of those who cannot pay to the vagaries of
politics and to the preferences of those who can command legislative
and judicial majorities. We need public and private partnerships to
ensure access.. .to meet unmet needs, to generate innovation, and
yes, to challenge inefficiencies. 2 '
Minow's vision of the public-private welfare state is one
that is truly democratic because the poor, among others who
receive welfare, will no longer be demonized by those who
attempt to validate particular moral views of welfare by
imposing those views on public policy. Instead, through public-
private collaboration, a wide range of welfare values will be
reflected in options available to individuals. In the end, she
mistrusts the capacity of both the legislative and judicial
branches to reconcile conflicting views by instituting mutual
tolerance for private providers representing different
communities of faith and morality while respecting essential
public values such as tolerance, constitutional norms of liberty,
and individual choice. The ultimate answer to meeting the
needs of the poorest and most neglected, in her view, would be
a "serious, steady, and substantial public commitment - one
that may be fulfilled in partnership with private providers.... ,124
Minow's proposal to enhance the connections between
public and private forms of welfare is highly idealistic because
it relies on achieving enlightened public commitment. Yet it
accurately portrays our future. Privatization has long been a
part of the American welfare state, and its role is growing.
Expanding the state in the manner in which she describes will
not achieve consensus; instead it will require a political
solution, coalition building, effective advocacy by those who
have been left behind by the recent rise in wealth, and a more
effective response to symbolic politics that mischaracterize
those who are in need as morally deficient.
122 Id. at 138.
123 Id. at 140.
124 MINOW, supra note 119, at 138.
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C. Becoming the State: Enhancing Local Democracy
The dilemmas created by an increasingly large and
complex public-private welfare state may have an old and
simple solution according to theory and practice being
developed by progressives who advocate "deeper democracy" at
the local level. Bypassing the nearly insuperable structural
barriers to building national political movements'25 in favor of a
more labor-friendly, poverty-ending, or pro-consumer welfare
state, some scholars and activists are promoting and studying
coalitions among traditionally competing political interests.
These coalitions combine labor and business, welfare-to-work
recipients, low-wage workers, and established trades, with
public support from local or regional government.
Grassroots organizing for economic development has
often had a political component. 2 ' In truth, few gains could be
maintained without the support of government, at the very
least through tax breaks or other benefits afforded not-for-
profits, but often also through special benefits or laws intended
to lock in opportunistic political gains.'27 Simon argues that the
political focus of low-income communities can often be
extremely narrow and self-interested, displaying little of the
public-regarding rhetoric associated with broader public
interest movements. Their narrow, self-interested political
focus, he argues, offsets their economic disadvantages as low-
income people.'28
The model of deepening democracy envisions a broader,
mutually cooperative coalition of traditional opponents within
a semi-autonomous institutional setting - a sector of the
economy, a local government, or a school system - a movement
defined by similarity of demography and interest. The rationale
is to include enough traditionally competing actors so that
when agreement is reached, the agreement itself is an effective
instrument of governance that reorganizes relationships among
the participants to achieve gains in efficiency, productivity, and
communal support - in other words, welfare. As such, each
successful coalition replaces existing competitive relations with
... See Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997)
(defeating the fusion party strategy of the third party movement in Minnesota).
126 SIMON, supra note 99, at 7.
127 See Gordon, supra note 109, at 1-2.
128 SIMON, supra note 99, at 76.
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more mutually beneficial cooperative relations, thereby
becoming a component of a reorganized welfare state.'"
Bernhardt' ° provides an example of a business sector
coalition, the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership
(WRTP), that restructured the employment relationship for
many low-wage and welfare-to-work employees by creating
mutually cooperative arrangements among business
competitors who benefited from a reliable supply of skilled
workers at a cost born equally among competitors for their
services. Professors Archon Fung and Erik 0. Wright discuss
other local democracy experiments that have achieved at least
partial success in a wide range of community settings and
policy areas: decentralization in the Chicago school system,
participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre, Brazil, village
governance in India, and production of Habitat Conservation
Plans under the Endangered Species Act.'31 Each experiment
successfully created a more inclusive democratic base for
political, economic, or administrative decision making that
included some previously excluded, relatively powerless
members of the community who benefited from a redistribution
of public or private welfare. Redistributed benefits included
better jobs and fringe benefits, responsive municipal
government, environmental amenities, or better education for
their children.
The present ideological climate favors the experiments
advocated by these scholars. A key structural characteristic of
the sector, local government, institution, or other setting in
which the experiment can succeed is devolution; together the
actors must be able to exercise real power. At the same time,
Fung and Wright note that an agreement among the parties
will be effective and constitutive of their future relations only if
backed by a higher authority, in most cases the state, a
condition they term "coordinated decentralization." The higher
central authority must agree to respect and enforce the
decision reached through deliberation among local actors. It
12 ARCHON FUNG & ERIK OLIN WRIGHT, DEEPENING DEMOCRACY:
INSTITUTIONAL INNOVATIONS IN EMPOWERED PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE, THE REAL
UTOPIAS PROJECT IV (2003).
30 BERNHARDT, ET AL., supra note 1.
13' FUNG & WRIGHT, supra note 129, at 3, 259. See also Michael C. Dorf &
Charles F. Sabel, Drug Treatment Courts and Emergent Experimentalist Government,
53 VAND. L. REV. 831 (2000).
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follows that the agreements are not voluntary, but binding and
enforceable in some way by governmental authority.
Fung and Wright's careful assessment of the
experiments identifies important preconditions, in particular
the deliberative style of decision making undertaken by each
group. A deliberative style of decision making is non-
adversarial, relies on reasoned argument, and yields
compromise as well as commitment to decisions. Of all the
preconditions for success, they acknowledge, deliberative
decision making and commitment will be the most problematic.
Further, power imbalances will be nearly unavoidable among
participants in such attempts to reorganize social relations and
the local welfare state. Unless an imbalance of power can be
checked by opportunistic alliances, conditional rewards for
deliberation by a higher level of authority, or threats by such
low-wage worker or consumer-friendly groups as unions or
local advocacy organizations, truly deliberative decision
making may not develop.'32 While these examples show that the
local welfare state may be reformed to achieve progressive
welfare state goals, these experiments will not be easy to
replicate. Their reliance on unique circumstances, exceptional
political coalitions, or high levels of social capital suggests that
broader transformation will be difficult to achieve.
Finally, the factors that limit replication of the WRTP or
successful Habitat Conservation Plan negotiations by members
of the middle and working class are even more problematic for
the working poor and dependent poor who seek better safety
net provisions. Handler's evaluation of welfare reforms
acknowledges the differences in results achieved through
widely varying state approaches to public assistance following
the devolution of responsibility under TANF. 3' Sharp
divergence between the benign outcomes for recipients who
benefit from public assistance in Utah's program offering
intensive support for the hard-to-assist and those who are left
destitute and homeless under Florida's rigorous "work first"
132 FUNG & WRIGHT, supra note 129, at 282-85. See also JOEL F. HANDLER,
DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT 133
(1996). For another critique suggesting that the inherent inequalities among members
of the coalition are likely to create serious problems of long-term stability, see Gordon,
supra note 13. See also SIMON, supra note 99. Simon's penetrating appraisal of the
Community Economic Development movement also concludes that the instability of
low-income communities poses a substantial threat to sustained, effective
representation of their interests. Id.
133 HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 9, at 58-93.
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program illustrates the range of possibilities. But central to
this evaluation is the principle that far higher costs are
associated with successful programs. As the national economy
has weakened, Utah has cut back its intensive support
programs. Without additional federal financial support and
federal benchmark standards that reflect what has been
learned from successful programs, costly but effective programs
will be severely limited. Moreover, a politically weak minority
such as the poor, who often have overlapping political
disadvantages associated with poverty, gender, and race (and,
for a large proportion, disability or health problems), are
unlikely to achieve changes in policies at the state or local level
on their own. The problems of "street-level" bureaucracy will
only be exacerbated by devolution of responsibility for policies
to the local level together with "government by objective
delegation" of new responsibilities to frontline workers to help
recipients with work and time limits."
Because of the acknowledged barriers to political
mobilization for mutually beneficial redistribution of benefits
and opportunities, the state remains the ultimate provider of
entitlements and oversight, especially for those who are unable
to meet the demands of the unregulated labor market.
V. CONCLUSION: THE LOCAL WELFARE STATE AND ITS
PROSPECTS
The moral politics of public and private welfare in the
American welfare state has a profound relationship to the
safety net we have created to moderate the risks inherent in
our capitalist economy, such as job loss, disability, or
abandonment. The safety net inevitably has redistributive
effects because the costs of losing a job or having no medical
care or being overwhelmed by debt must be placed somewhere.
Who will bear the cost is always a political issue. The most
cherished provisions of our safety net, including basic health
insurance, social security pensions for the poor, elderly, or
disabled, and unemployment and workers compensation
134 See MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMAS OF THE
INDIVIDUAL IN PUBLIC SERVICES (1980) (documenting effective control of the
implementation of policies by frontline workers). See also Brodkin, supra note 84
(describing the structural limits on caseworker discretion imposed by limited capacity
and conflicting goals). See also HANDLER, supra note 132 (describing rare instances of
empowerment of dependent persons who must rely on politicians, employers, or
administrators for access to benefits).
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insurance for working age Americans, were considered a
birthright by the previous generation of Americans. As
contributors to this symposium describe, the contemporary
politics of welfare has placed this safety net in jeopardy.
Contributors to the Sparer Symposium have
documented the widening gaps in America's safety net. They
have also suggested changes in policy that would better serve
the needs of those who bear the highest costs of insecurity in a
competitive, risk-based economy, and some contributors
described experiments that have succeeded in reclaiming parts
of the safety net for working Americans. The contributors
approach the problems and solutions from divergent
perspectives. Professor Elizabeth Warren argues that
bankruptcy has been overregulated in favor of creditors and
that bankruptcy laws should tolerate greater latitude for
market choices by consumers and for their assumption of debt.
From a different perspective, Professor Regina Austin raises
important questions about the market itself, drawing our
attention to the negative effects of privatization and
deregulation that exacerbate the virtual exclusion of a large
proportion of African-Americans and other poor persons of color
from meaningful participation in our consumption-driven
society.
In this Afterword I have argued that many advocates for
those who have been placed at greatest risk by the vanishing
safety net, including many symposium contributors, are
adapting their strategies to the contours of deregulated,
devolved, and privatized governance. Because the dominant
political consensus favors reducing or eliminating the role of
federally administered programs to manage the economic risks
for the majority of Americans, the proposed new safety net
strategies use the power of markets, private initiative, and
local politics in creative ways.
At least three broad strategies have attracted the
attention of scholars and activists. The first deploys market
forces through collective action by or on behalf of the poor,
working poor, or insecure middle class to restore fringe benefits
and economic stability for contingent and low-wage workers.
The second harnesses the resources and motivation of
community-oriented charitable organizations. A third strategy
uses the regulatory power of the local state to manage and
enforce partnerships between workers, employers, and public
officials that build "high road" economies for individuals who
would otherwise be left on the economic margin. All three
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strategies have been used successfully to restore some elements
of the safety net for some of those who are least secure.
Yet none of these approaches promises solutions for all
of those who are being left behind. Each of the strategies
depends on the availability of resources, including external
sources of funding, continuing commitment by key
participants, and power to enforce important goals of our
liberal society, such as inclusion, tolerance for diversity, and
accountability - features of the welfare state that are placed in
jeopardy when public sponsorship of welfare is lost. These
problems become increasingly critical and difficult to resolve
for the poorest and most dependent members of our society. It
is no coincidence that many of the most successful examples of
community-based strategies for restoring the safety net
described by contributors to this symposium and others have
organized the best educated, most employable members of the
working and middle classes rather than the least educated and
poorest.
In the absence of market power or private economic and
social capital that enables the exercise of greater influence by
the needy, more elaborate strategies are required that harness
the regulatory power of the state and enhanced or "deepened"
participatory decision making. In sum, the inclusionary power
of government and law will be needed to guarantee what the
most marginal and excluded people acting alone cannot
demand. Yet the law has failed to do this in the past. Professor
Martha Minow has anticipated the need for a new form of civil
rights laws: laws guaranteeing the inclusion of minorities,
women, the poor and persons with disabilities, among others,
must be based on a "social relations" understanding of the role
of law.'35 A social relations approach, Minow argues, requires
laws created and interpreted with a deep knowledge of the way
that social relations include or exclude individuals, so that the
law might recreate social relations themselves to encourage
inclusion.'3' For poor persons, such a law might require
universal benefits that presume all citizens are entitled to
health or pension benefits. For low-wage employees, law might
restructure job markets or employer-employee relations to
eliminate barriers to entry-level jobs or to create career
135 MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND AMERICAN LAW 111 (1990).
136 Id.
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ladders. Minow concludes that the social relations approach to
civil rights requires participation by excluded groups in
legislating and interpreting the law.37 Only then will law
adequately address the needs of those who are persistently
disadvantaged by our moral politics and the market. Professor
Minow's insight takes us to the threshold of the dilemma faced
by today's advocates for a more inclusive safety net - creating
deeper participatory democracy for the excluded.
Advocates for a more effective safety net turn back to
the state, either in its traditional role of provider of last resort,
or, at the leading edge of social experiments, as guarantor of
the gains won through deepened democracy from below. Thus,
some advocates call for a return to entitlements, arguing that
only the federal government's resources and capacity for
nation-wide administration will meet the needs of the
economically insecure, poor, and dependent. However, a
growing number of advocates are considering the opportunities
for deepened democracy - a strategy of coalition building that
enables those on the economic or social margins to strike an
enforceable bargain with better-off economic players. Such
bargains exchange the untapped resources and ability of
marginal consumers or workers for the means needed to
develop their productivity and a safety net that makes
sustained participation possible.
To make either strategy successful, the public sector is a
necessary element. To be sure, the federal government has the
capacity to enable distributive fairness and an adequate safety
net. But advocates are demonstrating that there can be an
effective alternative to direct regulation by the federal
government, namely using the more readily accessible local
state as a standard setter and enforcer of deals engendered
through deliberative democracy at the local, or even the
national level. The future, then, is politics. In this future,
where the way ahead is still uncharted and success is still quite
uncertain, advocates may discover that their commitment to
grassroots politics leads beyond opportunistic self-help or
enhanced local democracy toward deeper and broader welfare
for all citizens.
137 Id.
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